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The Pollution-Exclusion Conspiracy: A
Newly Recognized Basis for Recovery
JoHN G. NEVIUS & STEVEN

I.

J.

DOLMANISTH*

Introduction

Did liability insurance companies conspire to introduce
an ambiguous pollution exclusion in their standard-form policies at the advent of the federal environmental regulatory
framework in the early 1970s? The drafting and regulatory
approval history of the pollution-exclusion clause, as well as
court decisions that analyze the circumstances and history of
the exclusion's development, indicate that the answer is yes.
The New Jersey Supreme Court found that the introduction
of the pollution exclusion was deceptive and perhaps even
fraudulent in the seminal case, Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General
Accident Ins. Co.' More recently, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania recognized the
legal viability of causes of action against insurance companies for misrepresentation, insurance industry-wide conspiracy to defraud, and bad faith, based on the drafting,
regulatory history and the use of the pollution-exclusion
held that such claims should survive a moclause. 2 The court
3
tion to dismiss.
In 1970, the Insurance Rating Board (IRB) and the Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau (MIRB), trade organizations
representing liability insurance companies, represented to
state insurance regulators throughout the country, the in* The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Steven J.
Dolmanisth, Esq. in the development of some of the ideas and information
presented herein.
1. Morton Intl, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 831 (N.J. 1993).
2. Continental Casualty Co. v. Diversified Indus., Inc., 884 F. Supp. 937
(E.D. Pa. 1995).
3. Id. at 965.
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sured, and the public that they were "clarifying" current coverage by introducing a pollution exclusion. 4 The clarification
was purportedly designed to ensure that policyholders knew
that their standard-form liability policies did not cover intentional pollution, but only covered "unexpected and unintended" pollution.5 State insurance regulators approved the
use of the exclusion based on these representations. 6 Moreover, because the exclusion was presented as merely a clarification of the then-existing coverage, insurance companies
were permitted to add the exclusion to their policies without
7
a premium discount.
Subsequently however, when environmental liabilities
increased dramatically, especially after the enactment of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act of 19808 (CERCLA), insurance companies
disavowed their earlier representations and treated the exclusion not as a clarification, but as a significant restriction of
coverage. 9 Since the early 1980s, insurers have routinely relied on the exclusion to deny coverage for pollution-related iI4. See Morton, 629 A.2d at 851. See also Joy Tech. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
421 S.E.2d 493, 499 (W. Va. 1992).
5. See Morton, 629 A.2d at 851. See also Kelly J. Sosnow, Insurance Industry Misrepresentationand the Pollution-ExclusionClause - Morton International Inc. v. GeneralAccident Insurance Co. of America, 629 A.2d 831 (N.J.
1993), 18 HAv. ENrTL. L. REv. 249, 251 (1994) [hereinafter Sosnow].
6. Sosnow, supra note 5, at 251.
7. See Morton, 629 A.2d at 851-53.
8. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA) §§ 101-405, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. 1989), as
amended by Act of Nov. 5, 1990, CERCLA § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1988 &
Supp. 1993). CERCLA was amended by the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9674 (1988)). CERCLA provides the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) with the authority to respond to releases
of hazardous substances into the environment and to seek reimbursement for
cleanup costs incurred from responsible parties. CERCLA § 104(a)(1), 42
U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1988). Alternatively, EPA may require potentially responsible parties (PRPs) to undertake such cleanup pursuant to CERCLA § 106(a).
CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988). Liability for cleanup-related
costs is joint and several pursuant to CERCLA § 107, in that a responsible
party can be found liable for all of the costs incurred by EPA in responding to or
removing the release or threatened release of hazardous substances. CERCLA
§ 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988).
9. See Morton, 629 A.2d at 852-53.
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abilities unless the pollution was the result of an abrupt or
instantaneous event. 10 This interpretation introduces a temporal requirement" relating to the cause or source of pollution that did not exist before the introduction of the
exclusion. Further, it was not included in the insurance infilings concerning the scope and
dustry's original regulatory
12
intent of the exclusion.
This "revised" interpretation enabled insurance companies to decline coverage for millions of dollars of environmental liabilities; costs the policyholders then had to incur
without the aid of the "all risk" insurance for which they had
paid substantially. Moreover, this "bait and switch" tactic
has contributed to the extraordinary sums that both policyin transaction
holders and insurance companies have paid
3
liabilities.'
environmental
costs concerning
The controversy regarding the scope of the pollution exclusion has spawned hundreds of insurance coverage cases.14
Recently, several state appellate courts, upon a determination of ambiguity in the language of the policy, have reviewed
the drafting and the regulatory history of the exclusion and
uncovered compelling evidence that the insurance companies
15 Insurance
conspired to knowingly create the ambiguity.
10. Id. at 852.
11. Waste Management of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 340 S.E.2d
374, 382-83 (N.C. 1986), reh'g denied, 346 S.E.2d 134 (N.C. 1986) (the first state
supreme court case holding that the use of the word "sudden" in policies only
covers abrupt or precipitant pollution events and is not simply to be construed
as requiring that the pollution for which coverage is sought be unexpected or
unintended). See Sosnow, supra note 5, at 254.
12. Morton, 629 A.2d at 851-53.
13. See J. Acton and L. Dixon, Superfund and Transaction Costs: The Experience of Insurers and Very Large Industrial Firms, Rand Study, The Institute for Civil Justice (1991). The Rand Study "found that insurance companies
faced with environmental claims spent 88% of their money - or $410 million on transaction costs, including insurance coverage litigation against their policyholders." Id. at 26.
14. See Pepper's Steel & Alloys, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.,
668 F. Supp. 1541, 1549 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (referring to a "plethora of authority"
regarding the pollution exclusion "from jurisdictions throughout the United
States").
15. See, e.g., Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 456 N.W.2d 570 (Wis. 1990);
Morton, 629 A.2d at 852-54; Joy Tech., 421 S.E.2d at 499.
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companies introduced the pollution exclusion which denied
coverage for liability from unexpected and unintended pollution without a commensurate reduction in the premium. 16
Evidence surrounding the introduction of the pollution
exclusion has been an important element of litigation concerning the allocation of environmental remediation costs between business, government, individuals, and the insurance
industry. Recent evidence which reveals an intent to deceive
the regulators of the insurance industry, as well as insurance
purchasers, will likely focus more attention on the introduction of the pollution exclusion. The existence of a conspiracy
and the facts surrounding the introduction of the pollution
exclusion support a cause of action for misrepresentation and
possibly even intentional fraud. At a minimum, insurers who
engaged in such activities should be equitably estopped from
taking advantage of the ambiguity and confusion that they
themselves created, and from denying coverage on grounds
that a pollution incident was not sufficiently abrupt to be construed as "sudden".
Moreover, claims of misrepresentation, conspiracy to defraud, and bad faith on the part of the insurance industry
sound in tort and not in contract. Therefore, a finding of ambiguity in the insurance contract language is not a prerequisite for a court to inquire into the drafting and introduction
history of the pollution exclusion. The recent recognition in
federal court of such causes of action represents an important
legal development, particularly in states that previously
found the pollution exclusion unambiguous and upheld the
requirement that pollution be abrupt or sudden in order for
coverage to exist.17 Further, the conspiracy issue has important implications as the nation wrestles with CERCLA
reauthorization and federal and state legislative efforts to allocate remediation costs.
This paper begins with a brief review of the drafting and
regulatory approval history of the pollution exclusion and the
16. Morton, 629 A.2d at 853.
17. Continental Casualty Co. v. Diversified Indus., Inc., 884 F. Supp. 937
(E.D. Pa. 1995).
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case law that has applied and interpreted it. The paper then
addresses the argument that the insurance industry should
be estopped from denying coverage for unexpected and unintended gradually occurring pollution based on its prior misrepresentations to state regulators. The paper then
specifically addresses whether the insurance industry intentionally deceived both the regulators and the public alike as
to the extent and scope of the exclusion. The paper concludes
that the evidence strongly suggests that there was a conspiracy designed to mislead state regulators and policyholders regarding the changes wrought by the insertion of the
pollution-exclusion clause into comprehensive general liability policies.
II. Background
In the late 1960s and 1970s, the public became aware of
pollution and the potential impact of toxic chemicals on
human health and the environment. Previously, common
waste handling and disposal practices were found to have
caused unexpected and unintended harm.' 8 However, significant groundwater contamination has been documented even
at landfills that historically received only household waste.19
As a result, while fulfilling their basic public functions, local
municipal governments are being subjected to increasing environmental liability.
Under current state and federal strict liability environmental laws, local governments, businesses, and even indi18. See, e.g., Joy Tech., 421 S.E.2d at 498 (discussing the evidence that the
disposal practices used by Joy Technologies which caused pollution were common in the industry at the time, and that no evidence was presented indicating
that Joy Technologies intended to harm the environment). See also Steven Ferrey, The Toxic Time Bomb: Municipal Liability for the Cleanup of Hazardous
Waste, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 197 (1988) [hereinafter Ferrey]. Operation of the
Charles George Landfill resulted in contamination of the public water supply in
the late 1970s. However, the landfill operated under a state-issued permit from
approximately 1973 to 1976, and did not stop receiving waste until 1983. Id. at
217-19.

19. Ferrey, supra note 18, at 208-10. Estimates of the proportion of hazardous waste in a typical municipal waste stream are generally less than 0.1% by
weight. Id.
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viduals face substantial claims for cleanup costs of landfills. 20
Such claims often result in complex litigation and enforcement actions between federal and state regulatory agencies
and potentially liable parties, as well as extensive litigation
by potentially liable parties seeking contribution from other
21
parties.
When faced with such regulatory actions and litigation,
parties turn to their liability insurance for protection. Comprehensive general liability (CGL) insurance policies are, as
the name suggests, designed to provide policyholders, including governments and businesses, with comprehensive protection against all forms of unexpected and unintended liability,
including environmental property damage. 22 Such protection
generally charges the insurance company with two duties:
the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify. Under its duty
to defend, the insurance company promises to defend the policyholder from all suits brought against the policyholder for
potentially covered damages. 23 Under its duty to indemnify,
the insurance company promises to pay all covered damages
that the policyholder legally incurs. 24 The policy language
contained in most of the CGL insurance policies sold in the
United States is drafted by insurance industry trade associa20. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that
CERCLA can potentially impose liability on municipalities which dispose of
municipal solid waste. B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192 (2d Cir.
1992). This is also consistent with current EPA policy whereby municipal
wastes which contain hazardous substances, as defined in CERCLA § 101(14),
potentially fall within the liability framework of CERCLA. CERCLA § 101(14),
42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988); 54 Fed. Reg. 51,071, 51,074 (1989).
21. Under CERCLA's liability provisions, any person, which includes municipalities and corporations, can be held liable for cleanup-related costs simply
for arranging for the disposal of materials containing hazardous substances.
CERCLA § 107(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (1988). Municipalities and businesses can therefore be sued by previously-identified responsible parties seeking to compel contribution for their share of costs associated with cleanup
activities. Id.
22. Nancy Ballard & Peter Manus, Clearing Muddy Waters: Anatomy of
the Comprehensive General Liability PollutionExclusion, 75 CORNELL L. REV.
610, 620-21 (1990).
23. Sue C. Jacobs, The Duty to Defend, 539 PRACTICING L. INST. 489 (1995).
24. Nicholas P. Alexander, Developments in Indemnity Law: Express, Implied, Contractual,Tort-based and Statutory, 79 MAss. L. REv. 50, 52 (1994).
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tions.25 These associations have the responsibility to submit

the policy forms on behalf of their "subscriber" insurance
companies to state regulators for approval. 26 From 1973 to
1985, the following pollution-exclusion language was inserted
into the standard CGL insurance policy form used by most
insurance companies in the United States:
This insurance does not apply . .. (f) to bodily injury or

property damage arising out of the dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic
chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon the land,
the atmosphere or any water course or body of water; but
dispersal,
this exclusion does not apply if such discharge,
27
release or escape is sudden or accidental.
III.

Pollution-Exclusion Language History

Prior to the mid-1960s, standard-form CGL insurance
policies provided coverage for property damage associated
with an "accident".28 Although such policies did not typically
define an "accident," courts historically recognized that the
term "accident" did not have a temporal element. Instead,
courts have interpreted it as meaning "an unexpected, unforeseen, or undesigned happening or consequence from
either a known or an unknown cause." 29 By the late 1960s,
the term "accident" was consistently interpreted as "an unexpected happening without intention or design."30 As a result,
property damage associated with the unexpected and unin25. Ballard & Manus, supra note 22, at 625.
26. Id. at 621.
27. Id. at 613.
28. Morton, 629 A.2d at 849.
29. See, e.g., Hauenstein v. Saint Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 65 N.W.2d 122,
126 (Minn. 1954); accord Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. v. Indem. Ins.
Co., 104 N.E.2d 250, 254 (Ill. 1952).
30. Beacon Textiles Corp. v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 246 N.E.2d 671,
673 (Mass. 1969). See also Sharon M. Murphy, The 'Sudden and Accidental"
Exception to the Pollution-ExclusionClause in Comprehensive General Liability
Insurance Policies: The Gordian Knot of EnvironmentalLiability, 45 VAND. L.
REV. 161, 165 (1992).
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tended gradual accumulation of pollutants was held to trigger coverage under CGL insurance policies. 31
In 1966, representatives of the insurance industry jointly
revised the standard-form policy language to provide coverage for damages caused by the happening of an "occurrence"
as opposed to an "accident".32 This ostensibly eliminated the
potential confusion regarding a temporal requirement and
extended coverage to include the gradual accumulation of
33
pollutants.
In 1970, the insurance industry presented the pollution
exclusion as a clarification of the "neither expected nor intended" language in the definition of an "occurrence" rather
than as a change in existing coverage.3 4 This clause was
drafted in response to concerns that the language of existing
CGL policies could be construed too broadly, thereby conceivably covering any pollution incident, and included the express intent to deny coverage for pollution incidents resulting
from intentional discharge or disposal. 35
31. See, e.g., Steyer v. Westvaco Corp., 450 F. Supp. 384, 390 (D. Md. 1978)
(damage to trees caused by discharges of pollutants over four-year period);
Grand River Lime Co. v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 289 N.E.2d 360, 361-62 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1972) (property damage caused by emissions from insured's operations
over seven-year period); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Martin Bros. Container &
Timber Prod. Corp., 256 F. Supp. 145, 149 (D. Or. 1966) (emission of fly ash
from insured's plant over a period of several months).
32. Ballard & Manus, supra note 22, at 624. The standard-form definition
of an "occurrence" that resulted from the 1966 revision provides that an "occurrence" means "an accident, including injurious exposure to conditions, which
results, during the policy period, in bodily injury or property damage neither
expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured." Id.
33. See, e.g., New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 933
F.2d 1162, 1197 (3d Cir. 1991); Morton, 629 A.2d at 847-48 (holding that the
1966 standard-form CGL policy was drafted with the intent to cover property
damage resulting from gradual exposure to conditions, including pollution, as
long as the policyholder neither expected nor intended the resulting damage).
34. Morton, 629 A.2d at 847-48. See also Sosnow, supra note 5, at 250-51;
Just, 456 N.W.2d at 575 (contemporaneous representations by the insurance
industry confirm that the drafting committee, in creating the exclusionary
clause, clarified but did not reduce the scope of coverage).
35. See Morton, 629 A.2d at 849-50 (citing James A. Hourihan, Insurance
Coverage for Environmental Damage Claims, 15 FORUM 551, 553 (1980) and
Thomas Reiter, The Pollution Exclusion Under Ohio Law: Staying the Course,
59 U. CN. L. REV.1165, 1195-96 (1991)).
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In reviewing evidence regarding the history of the pollution exclusion, the Morton court quoted the President of the
Insurance Company of North America (INA), a defendant in
the action, as saying that "INA will continue to cover pollution which results from an accidental discharge of effluents the sort of thing that can occur when equipment breaks
down. We will no longer insure the company which knowingly dumps its wastes."3 6 Moreover, as the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals found in the record:
[Alt the time Liberty Mutual adopted this standard-form
for the commercial general liability policy, a memorandum
entitled "Summary of Broadened Coverage Under New GL
Policies With Necessary Limitations to Make This Broadening Possible," was circulated internally within the company. That memorandum indicated that the policies
covered liabilities including:
Coverage for gradual BI [bodily injury] or gradual PD
[property damage] resulting over a period of time from
exposure to the insured's waste disposal. Examples
would be gradual adverse effect of smoke, fumes, air or
stream pollution, contamination of water supply or
vegetation. We are all aware of cases such as contamination of oyster beds, lint in the water intake of down
Pa. atmospheric
stream industrial sites, the 3 Donora
7
contamination, and the like.
The "sudden and accidental" language appearing at the
end of the pollution exclusion had been used and interpreted
before. That language used a term of art that had appeared
in boiler and machinery policies since the 1950s. This language had been repeatedly construed as providing coverage
for events which did not happen instantaneously, but rather
38
occurred unexpectedly.
36. Morton, 629 A.2d at 850 (citing Charles K. Cox, Liability Insurance in
the Era of the Consumer,Address Before the Annual Conference of the American
Society of Insurance Management (Apr. 9, 1970), quoted in Robert S. Soderstrom, The Role of Insurance in EnvironmentalLitigation, 11 FORUM 762, 767
(1976)).
37. Joy Tech., 421 S.E.2d at 498.
38. See, e.g., New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 933
F.2d 1162, 1197 (3d Cir. 1991); Anderson & Middleton Lumber Co. v. Lumber-
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This construction of the "sudden and accidental" language had been so clearly established that, by 1963, one of
the leading insurance treatises concluded that "the word
'sudden' should be given its primary meaning as a happening
without previous notice, or as something coming or occurring
unexpectedly, as unforeseen or unprepared for. That is, 'sudden' is not to be construed as synonymous with
39
instantaneous."
Since the insurance industry had already litigated the
construction of "sudden and accidental" in boiler and machinery policies, and moreover, since that phrase had been uniformly interpreted by the courts to mean "unexpected and
unintended," it therefore follows that the insurance-industry
drafters intended the exclusion to have that identical meaning as the "sudden and accidental" language they chose in
1970.40

Usually, these courts have focused exclusively on the literal language of the exclusion, rejecting assertions that the
language is ambiguous, and thereby refusing to review the
derivation of the pollution exclusion, and the representations
of the insurance industry associated with its regulatory approval. 41 However, because any of these cases arose from irresponsible waste management or disposal practices, similar
men's Mut. Casualty Co., 333 P.2d 938, 941 (Wash. 1959); New England Gas &
Elec. Ass'n v. Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp., 116 N.E.2d 671, 679 (Mass. 1953);
10A GEORGE J. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D, § 42:396 (perm. ed. rev. vol.

2d ed. 1982).
39. 11 GEORGE J. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE, § 42:383 (1963) (footnotes
omitted). The identical language appears in the most recent edition of the treatise. 10A,GEORGE J. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D, § 42:396 (perm. ed. rev.

vol. 2d ed. 1982). See also Sutton Drilling Co. v. Universal Ins. Co., 335 F.2d
820, 824 (5th Cir. 1964) (in action on policy insuring oil well drilling rig, sudden
meant "happening without previous notice or with very brief notice; unforeseen;
rapid. It does not mean instantaneously"); Picchetti v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co., 153 N.E.2d 209, 213 (Ohio App. 1957) (sudden "does not mean instantane-

ous"); Lovell v. Williams Bros., Inc., 50 S.W.2d 710, 713 (Mo. App. 1932) ("[I]t is
obvious that happening suddenly does not mean happening instantaneously").
40. "The judicial construction placed upon particular words or phrases
made prior to the issuance of a policy employing them will be presumed to have
been the construction intended to be adopted by the parties." 2 GEORGE J.
COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D, § 15:20 (1984).

41. Id. at 862.
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legal outcomes could have been based on the fact that the polsuch activity, or even that they may
lution was expected from
42
have been intended.
Numerous state and federal courts have denied insurance coverage on the basis of interpreting "sudden" as requiring a temporal attribute. 43 Other cases have recognized that
"sudden" can mean "unexpected" without a temporal element
and therefore, held that the exclusion is ambiguous. 44 Accordingly, these courts have held that pollution damage resulting from gradual discharges of pollutants 45is covered
under policies containing the pollution exclusion.
It has been suggested that these differing outcomes also
reflect differing policy considerations. 46 Arguably, insurance
policies should not be used as tools to indemnify intentional
polluters. However, extending the interpretation of the pollution exclusion to deny coverage to those who might be unwittingly liable for gradual pollution that was neither expected
nor intended serves both to frustrate and to defeat the pur47
pose of CGL insurance, and is, therefore, unwarranted.
IV.

Regulatory Approval History of Pollution
Exclusion

The contemporaneous statements by insurance industry
officials, the drafting and regulatory history of the pollution
exclusion, and the reasoning of those courts which have examined these statements and history, serve as compelling
42. Id. See also Sosnow, supra note 5, at 257-58.
43. See Morton, 629 A.2d at 857-62.
44. See, e.g., Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 380 S.E.2d 686 (Ga.
1989); Queen City Farms, Inc. v. Central Nat'l Ins. Co., 827 P.2d 1024 and New
Castle, 933 F.2d 1162. Some cases have held that the fact that so many cases
have interpreted "sudden" differently alone is evidence that the exclusion is ambiguous. See, e.g., Id. at 1196.
45. Id. at 857.
46. Sosnow, supra note 5, at 257-58.
47. "[O]ne fact emerges clearly from the drafting history... [the pollution
exclusion] ... when it was approved, both insurers and regulatory officials focused on intent as the factor that would determine whether coverage would be
provided .... No one suggested that the exclusion... was drafted or approved
in order to limit coverage to accidental releases of short duration." Ballard &
Manus, supra note 22, at 627.

11
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support for the conclusion: pollution exclusion represents a
clarification of the "occurrence" language, and allows coverage where the resulting pollution damage was "neither48expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured."
In 1970, the insurance industry, represented by the IRB,
submitted the pollution exclusion with a standard-form explanatory memorandum to state insurance commissioners
throughout the country for approval. 49 The insurance industry specifically represented to these state insurance commissioners that the pollution exclusion was intended to be
merely a clarification of the "occurrence" definition, and,
therefore, that pollution insurance coverage was to be denied
only in cases of intentional pollution:
Coverage for pollution or contamination is not provided in
most cases under present policies because the damages can
be said to be expected or intended and thus are excluded by
the definition of occurrence. The above exclusion clarifies
this situation so as to avoid any question of intent. Coverage is continued for pollution or contamination caused injuries when the pollution or contamination results from an
50
accident ....
The Morton court concluded the following regarding the
statements in this memorandum: "The first sentence is simply untrue."51 "The second sentence is even more misleading
48. Id. at 624.
49. New Castle, 933 F.2d at 1198.
50. Insurance Rating Board, Submission to Ins. Comm'r of W. Va. (May 18,
1970), reprinted in Ballard & Manus, supra note 22, at 626. This explanatory
memorandum was submitted to various state insurance commissioners in conjunction with the regulatory approval process. Insurance companies wishing to
sell insurance policies in a particular state generally must file their policy and
endorsement forms for approval with state insurance regulators. Id.
51. Morton, 629 A.2d at 852. Pollution coverage was explicitly provided for
prior to 1970. Id. The statement in the explanation "is not only astonishing but
inaccurate and misleading as well." Id.; accord Claussen v. Aetna Casualty &
Sur. Co., 676 F. Supp. 1571, 1573 n.4 (S.D. Ga. 1987). "The Court finds dishonesty in the representation made to the Georgia Insurance Department in 1970
that the pollution exclusion clause would have little effect on preexisting coverage." Id. In fact, many cases have held that pre-1970 "occurrence" policies were
"tailor-made" to cover most pollution liability. See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Sur.
Co. v. Martin Bros. Container & Timber Prods. Corp., 256 F. Supp. 145 (D. Or.
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than the first."52 "The succeeding sentence of the explanatory
memorandum continued to camouflage the literal effect of the
pollution-exclusion clause." 53 "[Tihe conclusion is virtually
inescapable that the memorandum's lack of clarity was deliberate."54 Additionally, according to Morton, the insurance industry's explanatory memorandum expressly states that
although coverage "is continued" for accidents, it does not
contain any indication that there is an overall reduction of
55
coverage or that insurance rates should therefore fall.

Other courts have reviewed and addressed the insurance
industry's regulatory and public representations regarding
the pollution exclusion and have reached similar conclusions. 56 In Claussen, the Georgia Supreme Court reviewed
the standard state filing documents and found that
"[diocuments presented by the Insurance Rating Board ... to

the Insurance Commissioner when the 'pollution exclusion'
was first adopted suggest that the clause was intended to ex57
clude only intentional polluters."
1966); City of Kimball v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 206 N.W.2d 632 (Neb.
1973).
52. Morton, 629 A.2d at 852. "[To characterize so monumental a reduction
in coverage [as the exclusion is construed today by the insurance industry] as
one that 'clarifies this situation' simply is indefensible." Id. at 852-53.
53. Id. at 853. In asserting that "coverage is continued," the explanation
invites the regulators and policyholders to rely on the belief that no further
restriction in coverage is provided by the introduction of the exclusion. Id.
54. Id. The insurance industry's other contemporaneous representations
regarding the intent and scope of the exclusion, including representations to
their insurance agents responsible for selling the policies, were identical, or at
least similar, to the representations contained in the explanatory memorandum. Morton, 629 A.2d at 848-55.
55. Id. at 853.
56. See, e.g., Joy Tech., 421 S.E.2d at 499 (although the court applied Virginia law, it noted that under Pennsylvania law, the defendant insurance company's current interpretation of the exclusion would be "inconsistent" with the
"studied, unambiguous, official and affirmative representations," and accordingly, against public policy). Id. at 497.
57. Claussen, 380 S.E.2d 686 at 689. The Insurance Rating Board specifically represented to the Georgia Insurance Commissioner: "Coverage for expected or intended pollution is not now present as it is excluded by the
definition of occurrence. Coverage for accidental mishaps is continued." Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 676 F. Supp. 1571, 1583 (S.D. Ga. 1987).
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Similarly, the Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed that
"[c]ontemporaneous representations by the insurance industry confirm that the drafting committee, in creating the exclusionary clause, clarified but did not reduce the scope of
coverage."58 The holding of the Just court underscores the
proposition that it was the intent expressed to the insurance
regulators in the filing statements that is relevant to the interpretation of the pollution exclusion, regardless of the underlying intent of the insurance industry. "This expressed
intent was also the interpretation relied upon by insurance
regulators in approving the exclusionary clause."59 Policyholders as well have a right to rely on the expressed intent of
the insurance industry.
The insurance industry denies that it never expressed
any intent to reduce coverage in the pollution exclusion.
These and other insurance industry arguments appear to be
false. First, the insurance companies' position is contradicted
by the fact that most insurance commissioners approved the
exclusion as a mere clarification of coverage. 60 The West Virginia Insurance Commissioner who approved the pollution
exclusion stated in an affidavit that:
The insurers stated in pre-hearing submissions, at the
hearing, and in posthearing submissions that the proposed
[pollution-exclusion] endorsement forms did not limit or
narrow coverage and were not intended to do so. Based
upon those representations, I concluded that the pollution
endorsement forms did not narrow or limit coverage and,
58. Just, 456 N.W.2d at 584.
59. Id. at 575. The insurance industry has argued that internal industry
documents demonstrate the industry's "true" intent in the introduction of the
"polluter's exclusion." However, as the Just court stated, it is what the industry
agents actually represented to the insurance regulators that is dispositive, not
what the industry agents intended. Id. at 575, 578-79.
60. Despite the clear definition in the "occurrence" policy that an "accident
includ[es] injurious exposure to conditions...," the insurance industry's position appears to be that everyone in the insurance world knew that a
hypertechnical meaning is included in the term "accident" and that meaning
includes a "boom" requirement. Morton, 629 A.2d at 849. That requirement,
however, had been rejected by courts and insurance companies well before
1970. No such requirement was represented to the regulators or the public. Id.
at 852-53.
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instead, were mere clarificationsof existing coverage as defined and limited by the definition of the term 'occurrence."
Accordingly, I approved the endorsement forms IRB 335
and MIRB MB G008 submitted respectively by the InsurBoard and the Mutual Insurance Rating
ance Rating
61
Bureau.
This testimony is additionally significant because several
states held hearings on pollution exclusion, or required the
62
submission of supplemental explanatory information.
Thus, if the insurance industry did actually intend to restrict
the "occurrence" coverage, rather than to merely clarify it,
the industry had ample opportunity to make sure that the
insurance commissioners understood this intended distinction. Instead, the insurance industry reiterated that the pollution exclusion did not further restrict coverage, but that it
merely clarified "existing coverage as defined and limited by
63 As the West Virthe definition of the term 'occurrence'."
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals concluded:
[Iln view of the fact that in the present case the insurance
*

.

.[rating board] . . . representing [the insurance com-

pany] unambiguously and officially represented to the ...
[i]nsurance [clommission that the exclusion in question did
not alter coverage under the policies involved,

. .

.this

Court must conclude that the policies.., covered pollution
was
damage, even if it resulted over a period of time and
64
intended.
or
expected
not
was
it
gradual, so long as
Second, if the insurance industry had wanted to restrict coverage for gradual pollution or limit coverage to
damage arising out of "bloom" incidents, the insurance industry could have put such language in its exclusion. It
did not. Instead, the insurance industry utilized the "sudden and accidental" language which had been interpreted
to not include a temporal element.
At a minimum, the insurance industry could have explicitly informed the insurance regulators and the public
61.
62.
63.
64.

Joy Tech., 421 S.E.2d at 499 (emphasis added).
Morton, 629 A.2d at 853-54.
Joy Tech., 421 S.E.2d at 499.
Id. at 499-500.
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that the exclusion was intended to exclude gradual pollution. It did not. The insurance companies certainly had
the opportunity to explain that the exclusion was intended
to exclude gradual pollution in their explanatory memorandum and in responding to the many state regulators
who questioned whether the exclusion was only a clarification of coverage. In response to such questions, the insurance companies only reiterated that the exclusion was
merely a clarification. In fact, the insurance companies'
public representations and conduct was directly to the
contrary.
Third, the insurance companies' use of the term "clarification" when explaining the intent of the exclusion was
not happenstance. When filing explanatory memoranda,
the insurance industry organizations responsible for such
filings use specific terms of art to describe the effect of the
exclusion. The terms "clarification" and "restriction" are
two such terms of art. The former secretary of the Mutual
Insurance Rating Bureau, one of the organizations involved in developing the exclusion and filing it with state
insurance regulators, has acknowledged the use of the
term "clarification" in the explanatory memorandum was
intentional and meant to inform the regulators that the exclusion was not a further restriction in coverage. 65
65. See Affidavit of David E. Kuizenga, former Assistant Secretary and Sec-

retary of MIRB where he was employed from 1950 to May, 1973, sworn on November 30, 1993. "In my underwriting positions and as Assistant Secretary I

had the responsibility for issues involving general liability insurance and participated in the MIRB's General Liability Rating Committee and Policy Forms
Committee and the Joint General Liability Rating and Policy Forms Committees of the MIRB and the Insurance Rating Board (the 'IRB'). Those committees were responsible for drafting general liability form insurance policy
provisions.
"In 1970, the MIRB submitted provision nos. MB G008 and MB G009 to

insurance departments in all states, including Mississippi. Provision no. MB

G008 was entitled 'Exclusion (Contamination or Pollution).' Provision no. MB
G009 was entitled 'Supplementary Exclusion (Contamination or Pollution-Described Operations).'
"The manual for provisions nos. MB G008 and MG G009 contains a section
with the heading 'Explanation.' The second sentence of that section includes
the sentence: 'the above language clarifies this so as to avoid any question of
intent.' That sentence, or substantively similar language, appeared in the
manuals for numerous proposed changes to standard form insurance policy language which were submitted to state regulators by the MIRB and IRB. That
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V. Equitable Estoppel
Where the scope of the pollution exclusion is at issue in
future litigation, courts should follow Morton in equitably estopping the insurance industry from asserting a temporal requirement. This approach will prevent the insurance
industry from denying insurance coverage by taking unfair
advantage of any ambiguity in the pollution-exclusion language and of their inaccurate, or at least misleading, statements to the state insurance regulators, and the public as to
the intent of the exclusion.
Representations made by the insurance industry's
agents, the IRB and the MIRB, during the state regulatory
approval process are at the heart of the equitable estoppel
claim. Regardless of whether or not these were misrepresentations at the time they were made, they are cause for precluding the industry's subsequent disavowal of coverage for
gradually occurring pollution. The public policy purpose
served by regulatory approval is to provide an official explanatory opportunity whereby state regulators, acting as agents
for current and future policyholders, can fully and accurately
evaluate the implications of all proposed changes to the insurance policy language. The critical assumption underlying
this policy is that the insurance industry be unequivocally,
and accurately clear, complete and honest in all its representations. Any lack of clarity, or deviation from absolute honlanguage, as used in the manual for provision no. MB G008 and other state
filings, signifies that the coverage intended by the drafters of a policy term was
not as broad as was subsequently thought by courts or others, and that the
proposed provision clarifies the intent of the drafters of the provision as to the
scope of coverage.
"The Explanation section of the manual for provision nos. MB G008 and
MB G009 explains that MB G008 is a clarification of coverage intended under
'occurrence' based liability insurance policies. That section does not indicate
that MB G008 is a return to "accident" based coverage for contamination or
pollution claims.
"During my tenure at MIRB, when the MIRB and IRB sought to reduce the
scope of standard form liability insurance coverage, they would include a justification for the reduction in coverage in the manual submitted to the state regulators concerning the proposed change. The Explanation section of the manual
for provision nos. MB G008 and MB G009 states that provision no. MB G009 is
an exclusion of coverage." Id.
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esty, effectively serves to circumvent safeguards provided by
this review process.
The insurance industry should be held responsible for intentional misrepresentations, regardless of whether or not a
conspiracy existed, or even for inadvertent, inaccurate, or
misleading representations. The most appropriate remedy to
address the insurance industry's representations concerning
the pollution exclusion is to estop the insurance industry
from denying coverage under the pollution exclusion for gradual, unintended and unexpected pollution.
The holding of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in New
Castle confirms both the correctness and the reasonableness
of the court holding that the insurance industry should be estopped from repudiating the assertions it made during the
regulatory review process. 66 In New Castle the Third Circuit
supported its holding for coverage after extensively analyzing
the history surrounding the pollution exclusion, including its
drafting history, its adoption by state regulators, and its judicial treatment. 67 The New Castle court found that "insurance
company executives stated that the language of the clause
was a mere clarification of the 'occurrence' definition, excluding coverage only for expected and intended pollution."68 In
light of the pollution exclusion's history, the Third Circuit determined that the term "sudden" within the exclusion was
ambiguous. 69 Based on its factual findings, the court could
have arrived at the same result using estoppel.
Recent case law from the highest courts of several states
also supports estoppel claims. 70 The most recent and compelling decision with regard to the estoppel alternative is the
holding by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Morton. After
an exhaustive review of the insurance industry's representa66. New Castle, 933 F.2d at 1196-98.
67. Id. at 1192-98.
68. Id. at 1197-98 (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 1198. It further determined that giving "sudden" a non-temporal
meaning did not render "accidental" superfluous because "sudden means unexpected, and accidental means unintended." New Castle, 933 F.2d at 1194.
70. Seee.g., Morton, 629 A.2d 831; Joy Tech., 421 S.E.2d 493; Just, 456
N.W.2d 570.
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tions to insurance regulators and the public as to the underwriting intent and meaning of the exclusion, the court held
that the insurance industry was estopped from asserting that
the pollution exclusion precludes coverage for anything but
71 The court
intentional discharges of known pollutants.
found that even though it believed the term "sudden" was
ambiguous, the insurance companies should not be able to refuse coverage for gradual pollution because of the insurance
industry's misrepresentations made in filing the exclusion
with state insurance regulators. The court found that the
regulatory and public representations by the insurance industry were "paradigms of understatement," "misleading,"
"inaccurate," "indefensible," "camouflage," "lacking in candor," and "not straightforward." 72 In sum, the Morton court
refused to "condone the industry's misrepresentations to regulators in New73Jersey and other states concerning the effect
of the clause."
The Morton holding is not an anomaly. It is consistent
with the numerous decisions of other appellate courts that
have considered the facts surrounding the pollution exclusion. 74 For example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that
in presenting the pollution exclusion to state regulators for
approval and in selling it to policyholders, the insurance industry expressly and unequivocally represented that the75 exclusion was intended only to "clarify" existing coverage.
In light of these compelling authorities, the insurance industry should be estopped from interpreting the pollution-exclusion clause in any manner that is inconsistent with its
previous representations to insurance regulators and the
public. Equitable estoppel is available when: (1) promises or
inducements were made; (2) plaintiffs reasonably relied upon
the promises or inducements; and (3) plaintiffs will be
71. Morton, 629 A.2d at 848.
72. Id. at 852-54.
73. Id. at 848.
74. See Joy Tech., 421 S.E.2d 493; Just, 456 N.W.2d 570; Queen City, 827
P.2d 1024; Claussen, 380 S.E.2d 686; New Castle, 933 F.2d 1162.
75. Just, 456 N.W.2d at 574.
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harmed if the claim of estoppel is not allowed. 76 It is a doctrine of fundamental fairness that binds a party to its prior
position as evidenced by its prior representations or conduct.
It enables courts to adjust the relative rights of parties in accordance with the parties' duties of good faith and fair
77
dealing.
Under equitable estoppel, a policyholder may hold an insurance company to representations of broad coverage that
were advanced in various contexts during the insurance policy's development, regulatory approval, or marketing process. 78 In Morton, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that
"equity and fairness" require that the insurance industry be
bound by the pre-coverage representations it advanced regarding the pollution exclusion. 79 The Morton court explained that it is "appropriate and compelling" to apply
equitable estoppel to bind insurance companies to their representations of the early 1970s because:
Not only did the insurance industry fail to disclose the intended effect of this significant exclusionary clause, it
knowingly misstated [the clause's] intended effect in the
industry's submission of the clause to state Departments of
Insurance. Having profited from that nondisclosure by
maintaining pre-existing rates for substantially reduced
coverage, the insurance industry should be required to
bear the burden of its omission by providing coverage at a
76. Hydra-Mac, Inc. v. Onan Corp., 450 N.W.2d 913, 919 (Minn. 1990).
77. Northern Petrochemical Co. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 277 N.W.2d 408, 410
(Minn. 1979) (holding that estoppel is intended to prevent a party from taking
unconscionable advantage of his own wrong by asserting his strict legal rights).
78. The issue here is not an expansion of coverage. Instead, coverage that
existed at the time policies were purchased and that was represented to exist by
the insurance industry to the insurance regulators, the insured, and the public
should be provided. In addition, policyholders would not be unjustly enriched
by obtaining coverage that they did not pay for because they did, in fact, pay for
it. The insurance companies did not provide a premium reduction when they
introduced the pollution exclusion as they should have done if the exclusion was
a reduction in coverage. "[H]ad the industry acknowledged the true scope of the
proposed reduction in coverage, regulators would have been obligated to consider imposing a correlative reduction in rates." Morton, 629 A.2d at 853.
79. Id. at 874.
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with its representations to regulatory
level consistent
80
authorities.
Significantly, the New Jersey Supreme Court reached
this conclusion without any evidence of direct communication
between the parties of the action, and instead found privity of
the parties, and reasonable and detrimental reliance on the
81
part of state insurance commissioners and policyholders.
First, the court found that the IRB was the insurance industry's "designated agent, in presenting the pollution-exclusion
clause to state regulators."8 2 Second, the court found that insurance commissioners are, in effect, the agents of their
state's policyholders because they are charged by statute "to
protect the interests of policyholders' and to assure that 'inequitable and fair
surance companies provide reasonable,
83
public."
treatment to the insuring
Moreover, when the insurance commissioners approved
the exclusion, they relied on the industry's misrepresentations, and were, thereby, deprived of the opportunity to make
informed judgments about the premium and coverage issues
that resulted from the exclusion. Accordingly, policyholders
were lulled from acting "either directly or through intervention by state regulatory authorities, to encourage the industry to provide broader coverage for pollution damage, even at
increased rates, perhaps avoiding the litigation explosion
that the... clause ha[d] precipitated." 4 The court explained:
"The proposition [that the insurance company is estopped to
deny coverage] is one of elementary and simple justice. By
justifiably relying on the insurer's superior knowledge, the

80. Id. at 876.
81. Id. at 875. 'We are fully persuaded that the 'reasonable expectations' of
the New Jersey regulatory authorities should be imputed to those insured" to
whom policies were issued containing the approved pollution exclusion clause.

Id.

82. Id. at 874.
83. Morton, 629 A.2d at 874.
84. Id. at 876.

21

1124

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13

insured has been prevented from procuring the desired coverage elsewhere." 5
VI. Conspiracy
The Supreme Court addressed claims of a conspiracy and
its related causes of action of intentional fraud and misrepresentation in the context of the tobacco industry's efforts to refute evidence of the health effects of smoking. 6 The Court
rejected the tobacco industry's arguments that such claims
were preempted by federal regulation of cigarette labeling
and advertising because they were "predicated on a duty
'based on smoking and health."'8 7 The Court further recog-

nized that these claims were predicated on a general duty to
neither deceive nor conspire to commit fraud.88 It reviewed,
as well, the elements of an intentional fraud and misrepresentation claim under the applicable New Jersey state law as
presented by the District Court. 89 The Supreme Court stated
that such a claim "consists of the following elements: 1) a
material misrepresentation of... fact [by false statement or
concealment]; 2) knowledge of the falsity... ; 3) intent that
the misrepresentation be relied upon; 4) justifiable reliance
; [and] 5) resultant damage."90
Appendix A, on file with Pace Environmental Law Review, is an internal memorandum from Aetna Casualty &
Surety Company which discusses the potential implications
of the clarifying language of the pollution exclusion for use by
the IRB. 9 1 The IRB was the insurance industry organization
85. Id. at 873 (quoting Harr v. Allstate Ins. Co., 255 A.2d 208 (N.J. 1969)
(citations omitted).
86. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
87. Id. at 529.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 528 n.25. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 1487,
1499 (N.J. 1988).
90. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 528 n.25.
91. See Appendix A (on file with Pace Environmental Law Review). This
memorandum only came to light inadvertently. First, Aetna unsuccessfully attempted to limit its availability through a claim of privilege and then by asserting that it was subject to a protective order. Aetna was forced to release it
publicly in Morton, however, when the company faced a potentially embarrassing motion that would have questioned Aetna's representations to various
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which convened a committee to draft the exclusion language.9 2 This memorandum, now known as the "Guiney
memorandum", involved Francis Bruton, a high-level officer
of Aetna and one of the principle members of the committee
that drafted the pollution exclusion, and was involved with
its filing with the state insurance regulators. The memorandum addresses the potential public relations issue that the
pollution exclusion appeared93to reduce coverage without reducing insurance premiums.
The importance of this memorandum is that it documents a contemporaneous scheme by the insurance companies to deceive the state regulators and the public as to the
impact of the pollution exclusion. First, the document shows
that insurance industry representatives were aware that inserting the pollution exclusion into existing insurance policies could be perceived, and later used, as a reduction in
coverage.9 4 This knowledge contradicts the industry's representation to the insurance regulators, the insured, and the
public that the exclusion was a mere clarification of coverage.
Second, the document helps explain why the insurance industry did not directly draft the exclusion to exclude gradual pollution or directly inform state insurance regulators or the
public that the exclusion was a restriction of coverage. The
substance of the internal memorandum is evidence that the
insurance industry conspired to conceal its true purpose for
the pollution exclusion: to reduce potential future liability by
limiting the scope of coverage.
The insurance companies recognized "public policy" implications and knew that such a restriction would only be approved in conjunction with a premium rebate. Moreover, by
conspiring to keep the actual and intended impact of the pollution exclusion from the insurance regulators, the insured,
and the public, the industry avoided admitting that gradual
pollution was currently covered by existing policies.
courts that its version of the drafting history of the pollution exclusion was the
complete and accurate version.
92. Ballard & Manus, supra note 21, at 625.
93. See Appendix A (on file with Pace Environmental Law Review).
94. Id.
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All the necessary elements of intentional fraud and misrepresentation are present in the case of the insurance industry's "clarification" of coverage. 95 The industry knowingly
misrepresented the impact of the pollution-exclusion language in statements to state insurance regulators, acting as
agents for the policyholders, with the intent that such misrepresentations be relied upon. The states and policyholders
justifiably relied on those statements and incurred damages
for litigation costs and denials of coverage related to the restrictions imposed as a result of the pollution-exclusion
language.
The history of the development of the pollution exclusion
provides ample evidence of an insurance industry-wide conspiracy to misrepresent the exclusion's scope and effect. Recently, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania denied an insurance company's motion to dismiss claims of a conspiracy to misrepresent the
facts and bad faith regarding the development of the pollution exclusion. 96 This holding recognizes conspiracy as a viable cause of action. 97 Judicial recognition of such causes of
action has already spawned additional cases using the same
legal theory. 98 Such causes of action may prove crucial in
overcoming state law precedent where the pollution exclusion
has been held unambiguous and the term "sudden" has been
interpreted to mean abrupt or instantaneous, thereby introducing a temporal requirement into insurance coverage for
pollution events. 9 9

VII.

Conclusion

At issue is the scope of the pollution exclusion as the industry represented it to the insurance regulators, policyholders, and the public in the early 1970s. Numerous businesses
95. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 504 n.25 and accompanying text.
96. See Continental Casualty Co. v. Diversified Indus., Inc., 884 F. Supp.
937, 959 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., Hyde Athletic Indus., Inc. & Saucony Shoe Mfg. Co., v. Continental Ins. Co. et al, C.A. No. 95-5822 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
99. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
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and municipalities face substantial liability from unexpected,
unintended, and gradually occurring pollution. Entities that
purchased CGL insurance policies in reliance on the representations of the insurance industry and the subsequent approval of the "clarifying" language by insurance regulators
are entitled to insurance coverage for such liability. At a
minimum, the insurance industry should be estopped from
denying the same protection that the insurance companies
sold, as represented to state insurance regulators, policyholders, and the public.
Evidence that a conspiracy existed within the insurance
industry surrounding the development of the pollution exclusion goes beyond the issues of intentional misrepresentation
and estoppel, and clears the way for tort claims for punitive
damages. The viability of a conspiracy claim and the judicial
recognition of associated causes of action represent a powerful tool to force the insurance industry to shoulder its fair
share of environmental liability. Moreover, such causes of action will likely force states that have previously ruled against
CGL insurance policyholders to take a second look at precedents interpreting insurance contracts containing the pollution exclusion and the circumstances surrounding its
development.
The added cost to society of the litigation spawned by
this controversy must also be considered, particularly as the
legislatures of several states and Congress consider legislation to reallocate the burdens of environmental liability
between the insurance industry, government, and policyholders. The highly publicized "insurance crisis" should be evaluated in the context of the behavior of the insurance industry
regarding the pollution exclusion before any such legislation
is enacted.
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